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Appearances can be deceiving, however. In conjunction with the ground maneuver, the coalition's air component conducted its own multifaceted operations-operations that, according to air component commander Lt Gen T. Michael Moseley, ran the gamut from "strategic attack, to interdiction, to close air support, to resupply." 2 Significantly, Moseley's air plan focused not on breaking the regime's will or merely supporting a ground advance. Instead, as Moseley said, it focused on destruction: "I find it interesting when folks say we're softening them up. We're not softening them up. We're killing them." 3 Rather than paralyzing the enemy, Moseley sought to engage him in decisive battle-as Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz had suggested nearly two hundred years before.
Moseley's words are important for theorists and campaign strategists, for they suggest a role reversal between air and ground power and highlight joint success. Furthermore, they suggest a rethinking of contemporary air power theory, much of which has focused on paralysis. For Clausewitz, on the other hand, victory lay in "the sum of all strengths, physical as well as moral," and the two were interrelated. Loss in battle would affect the losing side psychologically, which would "in turn, [give] rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss of morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other." 17 Psychological paralysis and physical destruction were inseparable, and Clausewitz highlighted the latter: "destruction of the enemy forces is the overriding principle of war, and, so far as positive action is concerned, the principal way to achieve our object." 18 To underscore his argument in favor of decisive battle, the Prussian theorist flatly stated "we are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed." 19 Away from the embedded reporters and studio briefings, the air component put
Clausewitz's ideas into action. Rather than psychologically defeat regime leadership, airmen waged a classic battle of attrition and took away the regime's ability to respond. According to Maj Gen Daniel Leaf, the senior airman in the land component headquarters, they focused on the Republican Guard, which started Gulf War II with as many as 900 T-72 and T-62 tanks at between 80 and 90 percent effectiveness-more than twice as many tanks as coalition forces had in the theater. 20 Six Republican Guard divisions defended Baghdad; five of the six attempted to use the cover of sandstorms on 25 and 26 March to position themselves between the capital and advancing coalition forces-but found themselves stymied by superior surveillance and targeting from above. When ground forces did make contact with Republican Guard armor on March 30, the Iraqis could not mount a coordinated defense, and in Lt Gen Wallace's words, "the U.S. Air
Force had a heyday against those repositioning forces." 21 From that point on, Moseley exhorted his command to "kill them faster"; 2 and 3 April saw more than 1300 sorties-roughly 80 percent of the daily totals-target the Republican Guard. 22 Over the course of the air war, fully 15,592 targets, or 82 percent of the total, related to the ground battle. Guard were "no longer credible forces." 24 The following day, an Army intelligence officer briefed OIF commanders that the Medina Republican Guard Division had fallen to 18 percent of full strength while its sister division, the Hammurabi, was down to 44 percent, but noted "These numbers are somewhat in dispute. They may actually be lower." 25 On 5 April-the day the Army made its "thunder run" into Baghdad-Moseley confidently reported "that our sensors
show that the preponderance of the Republican Guard divisions that were outside of Baghdad are now dead." 26 Clearly, the air component-both alone, and in close coordination with its brothers on the ground-did more than psychologically imbalance Saddam's regime: it took away its major source of power. In Moseley's words, that allowed the "incredibly brave U.S. Army and U.S.
Marine Corps troops . . . to capitalize on the effect that we've had on the Republican Guard and .
. . to exploit that success." 27 Therefore, any depiction of OIF's campaign plan in Liddell Hart's terms would be incomplete at best. Certainly the ground forces used maneuver to set conditions for success; that maneuver, coupled with information operations and air power, undoubtedly upset the Iraqi troops' and regime's equilibrium. However, the "sword" did not drop "from a paralysed hand," as Liddell Hart forecast. 28 Coalition forces destroyed the sword in a Clausewitzian decisive battle.
Lessons Learned
Interestingly, the form of that decisive battle suggests a role reversal wherein ground forces maneuver for effect, and air and space forces bring the killing power to the fight. Until all the lessons learned reports and statistical compilations become available, the point will be moot-but air power had a phenomenal aggregate effect on ground forces in OIF. In the long run, the statistics matter less than the fact that jointness triumphed in this fight; as a number of on leadership and critical infrastructure, and never target fielded forces; Pape countered that air power was effective only when focused on those fielded forces. 30 The recent operations, seen through a Clausewitzian lens, suggest a middle ground: fielded forces can be strategic targets.
Clausewitz defined a center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends," 31 and the Republican Guard was precisely that: it undergirded all Saddam Hussein's operational and political power. Twelve years earlier, General Norman Schwarzkopf had called the Guard divisions "the heart and soul" of Hussein's army, 32 and it was the Republican Guard that brutally suppressed the Shi'ite rebellion after Gulf War I. Indeed, analyst
Rebecca Grant-among many others-argued that the Guard kept Saddam in power for nearly two decades, and that decimating Guard forces "signaled that Saddam's control over Iraq was about to collapse for good." 33 What better use could there be for any of the joint force commander's tools than to destroy an operational or strategic center of gravity? To be sure, fielded forces are not always centers of gravity-they were not in Kosovo, for example-but when a regime relies on an elite force to maintain power, air power should focus on that force's destruction.
Hussein's twenty-year reliance on the Republican Guard highlights a final lesson for the military theorist-a lesson that underscores the elegance and completeness of Clausewitz's descriptive power. As argued above, Liddell Hart emphasized paralysis, which he believed would ensure a better peace. Clausewitz, on the other hand, emphasized that war is merely a political tool, and that the aim of combat "is to destroy the enemy's forces as a means to a further end." 34 He cautioned that "the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final.
The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date." 35 
Implications for the Future
Although he wrote nearly 200 years ago, and with no concept of air power, Clausewitz's theory more completely explains recent history than does Liddell Hart's. Furthermore,
Clausewitz highlighted a number of pitfalls and problem areas that could still influence military operations. General Wallace's comment that "the enemy is a bit different from the one we wargamed against" calls to mind one Clausewitzian principle that the strategist will ignore at his peril: uncertainty. The Prussian master argued that "in war, everything is uncertain," lamented the "general unreliability of all information," and warned that the "difficulty of accurate recognition constitutes one of the most serious sources of friction in war." 36 Much contemporary military thought tends to discount uncertainty and friction, however; one prominent historian argued to a National War College audience that the entire spectrum of effects-based operations ignores the very possibility of uncertain information. 37 To be sure, 
Conclusion
To those who watched Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from afar, via CNN footage, embedded reporters' updates, and CENTCOM news briefings, the joint campaign appeared to embody a classic indirect approach. Despite difficult fighting around cities like Nasiriyah, ground forces shot through the country rapidly, leapfrogging enemy strongholds-precisely as 
